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The Scottish independence referendum in 2014 was a significant constitutional event in the 
United Kingdom. Following the Scottish vote to remain a part of the union, the UK Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, initiated several processes to enhance devolution in Scotland and 
in every other nation of the UK as well. This chapter discusses those reforms in Scotland, 
Wales, England and Northern Ireland and consider their implications for the UK constitution 
as a whole. 
 
Devolution in the UK has been a process of continuing changes since it was introduced 
formally to Scotland and Wales, and re-introduced to Northern Ireland, in 1999.
1
 These have 
been seen as individual processes with little in common between them. However, one 
significant event which has impacted all parts of the UK was the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum. The Scottish decision to remain a part of the UK can be seen as a catalyst to 
push on with devolution, not just in Scotland but in other parts of the UK as well. On the 
morning following the referendum David Cameron MP announced: 
 
So now it is time for our United Kingdom to come together, and to move forward. A 
vital part of that will be a balanced settlement – fair to people in Scotland and 
importantly to everyone in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as well…It is 
absolutely right that a new and fair settlement for Scotland should be accompanied by 
a new and fair settlement that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom.
2
 
 
As devolution in the UK has been a process of asymmetrical changes this chapter will 
consider the developments which have been initiated since the Scottish independence 
referendum in each nation of the UK. Mitchell notes that the legacy of each part of the UK 
needs to be taken into account to understand devolution because the UK is a ‘state of unions’ 
rather than a ‘union state’.3 It will conclude with a short consideration of constitutional 
implications and challenges which the UK and devolved administrations will need to respond 
to in the near future. 
 
Scotland 
 
Even prior to the independence referendum, Scotland was the most powerful devolved nation 
in the UK. Reforms since the referendum have increased the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament with claims from the UK government that Scotland now has ‘one of the most 
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powerful devolved parliaments in the world.’4 Since the initial Scotland Act 1998, the 
Scottish devolution settlement has gone through constitutional reforms in 2012 and 2016. 
 
The Scotland Act 1998 established the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government.
5
 
The parliament is elected through an additional member system, which is part proportional 
representation, and has 129 members. Scotland has a reserved powers model which means 
that the parliament may legislate on any matter other than what is reserved to the 
Westminster Parliament through Schedule 5 of the 1998 Act. General reservations include, 
inter alia, the constitution, foreign affairs, and defence.
6
 Other matters are specifically 
reserved in subjects such as, inter alia, finance and economy, home affairs, trade and 
industry, energy, transport and social security.
7
 The parliament also had fiscal powers under 
the Scottish variable rate to vary income tax by a rate of 3 pence.  
 
Although Scotland had a relatively stable form of devolution there was still room to consider 
reform. The Commission on Scottish Devolution (the Calman Commission) reported in 
2009.
8
 Its remit was to ‘review the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in light of experience’ 
and to make recommendations regarding constitutional arrangements, financial accountability 
of the Parliament, and to ‘secure the position of Scotland within the United Kingdom.’9 
Calman found that devolution to Scotland had been a success and that devolution was ‘here 
to stay’ within a political, economic and social union.10 In particular, it found a need to 
improve the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament and lessen the reliance on the 
block grant received from the UK.
11
 Therefore, it recommended the introduction of a new 
Scottish rate of income tax, to allow more borrowing powers for the Scottish Ministers and to 
devolve powers over other forms of tax.
12
 The division between devolved and non-devolved 
areas were quite ‘well drawn’ but there were some specific matters which could be devolved 
such as executive powers for the administration of Scottish Parliament elections and 
regulatory issues such as drink-driving and speed limits.
13
 It also made recommendations for 
strengthening the intergovernmental relations between Scotland and the UK.
14
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Its recommendations led the way towards the second stage of devolution in Scotland through 
the Scotland Act 2012.
15
 This Act transferred more fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in 
line with the Calman recommendations. Most prominently, it removes the Scottish variable 
rate and replaces it with a new Scottish rate of income tax, as well as transferring other taxes 
and the power to create new taxes.
16
 
 
When the Scottish National Party won a majority of seats in the 2011 Scottish Parliament one 
of their key proposals was to give the Scottish people a referendum on independence.
17
 The 
constitutional power to allow the Scottish government to hold such a referendum was 
transferred through an Order following the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012.
18
 The referendum 
itself was a tightly fought campaign. The beginning of September 2014 saw the campaign in 
favour of independence edge slightly ahead of their rivals in the polls for the first time.
19
 This 
initiated a response from the unionist UK parties who published a set of promises, which 
became to be known as ‘the Vow’, to the Scottish electorate if they voted to stay in the 
Union.
20
 These would guarantee that the Scottish Parliament would be a ‘permanent and 
irreversible part of the British constitution’ with more extensive powers, there would be 
fairness for Scotland within the Union, and a guarantee that the Barnett formula would 
continue so that Scotland could spend more on the National Health Service.
21
  
 
Following the No vote on 18 September, the UK Prime Minister initiated a swift process to 
implement those guarantees.
22
 The Smith Commission was announced on the morning of 19 
September and reported by the end of November.
23
 The Commission was tasked with leading 
a cross-party debate and agreement on further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament.
24
 This was done in three pillars; providing a durable and responsive constitutional 
settlement for Scotland; delivering prosperity, a healthy economy, jobs, and social justice; 
and strengthening the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament.
25
 The Conservative 
Manifesto in 2015 promised to implement the recommendations of the Commission and to 
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introduce a Scotland Bill.
26
 Subsequently, the Scotland Act 2016 is the third stage of Scottish 
devolution. 
 
The constitutional provisions in the Act are significant from a Scottish and UK perspective. 
Section 1 of the Act provides that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a 
permanent part of the UK constitutional arrangements and are not to be abolished other than 
by a referendum of the people of Scotland. Also, section 2 places the Sewel convention, that 
the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the 
Scottish Parliament, on a statutory footing.  
 
These are very significant constitutional developments in the UK context and raises 
fundamental issues regarding parliamentary sovereignty. In response to these proposals the 
House of Lords Committee on the Constitution has expressed concern regarding their 
constitutional implications.
27
 The Committee believes that section 1 provides a level of 
political entrenchment, but not legal entrenchment. However, it may also bring with it an 
element of uncertainty which may be open to differing interpretations.
28
 The Committee 
noted: 
 
It is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that Parliament is sovereign and 
that no Parliament may bind its successors…While we do not consider that it imposes 
any legal or constitutional restriction on the power of the UK Parliament, it does 
create the potential for misunderstanding or conflict over the legal status of the 
Scottish Parliament which may result in legal friction in the future.
29
 
 
Putting the Sewel convention on a statutory footing could also have constitutional 
implications. Again, the committee were of the opinion that this had a ‘symbolic 
significance’ and would recognise its existence rather than turn it into a ‘legally binding 
principle.’30 However, the Committee remained concerned that the courts could be 
unnecessarily drawn into an area traditionally controlled by conventions.
31
 
 
The 2016 Act extends the reforms under the 2012 Act by transferring further powers over 
elections and the composition of the Scottish Parliament. This gives the Scottish Parliament 
powers to change the franchise for its elections and to reform the disqualification and 
removal of its Members. The House of Lords Committee were concerned regarding the 
indirect constitutional effects of these provisions as it may lead to demands from other 
devolved legislatures for similar powers.
32
 The 2016 Act also devolves further specific 
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 5 
powers to Scotland over the Crown Estate, equal opportunities, tribunals, transport and 
consumer advocacy and advice.
33
 
 
The Act transfers further tax, borrowing and financial powers and powers over welfare 
benefits and employment support. The Barnett formula of allocating a block grant will 
continue in Scotland but will be adjusted in line with the new tax raising powers devolved to 
the Scottish Parliament.
34
 The devolution of welfare benefit could also have significant 
effects as it has traditionally been seen as a common Great Britain (GB) system.
35
 This will 
give the Scottish Government powers to amend the operation of GB wide benefits for 
Scottish claimants in certain circumstances and allow the Scottish Parliament to create new 
benefits to replace existing discretionary benefit schemes for carers, disabled people, and 
housing payments.
36
 The House of Lords Committee on Economic Affairs were concerned 
that the reforms to the Scottish fiscal framework were not logical, long-term or based on 
principle.
37
 As a result, they were worried that this could lead to a threat to the ‘existence of 
the Union.’38 These further powers also introduce an element of shared competence between 
Scotland and the UK which is an extra dimension to the tradition devolved or non-devolved 
divide.  
 
Scotland has received important powers since 2012 which sees it as one of the most powerful 
devolved legislatures in the World. This is a significant step forward for Scotland in terms of 
their autonomy. It may also have fundamental effects on the UK constitution and other 
nations of the UK as will be explored in the next sections.  
 
Wales 
 
It has been a cliché of Welsh devolution that it was dragged towards devolution ‘on the hem 
of a Scottish Kilt.’39 Wales were still hanging on to the proverbial kilt when Scotland 
advanced devolution in 2014. However, not much else is in common between the Scottish 
and Welsh devolution models at the moment as Wales has undergone a process of quite novel 
devolution designs.
40
 Establishing a standard and common settlement in Wales continues to 
be a challenge for the UK Government and a new impetus was gained in light of the Scottish 
referendum to implement changes which were already on the table. 
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The National Assembly for Wales was established by the Government of Wales Act 1998 as 
a corporate body with subordinate law making powers under a conferred powers model.
41
 
The National Assembly has 60 members and is elected through the additional member system 
like Scotland. Due to this limited model of devolution constitutional debate has been a 
consistent part of devolution in Wales.
42
 The National Assembly gradually received full law-
making powers through reforms under the Government of Wales Act 2006 but still within a 
conferred powers model.
43
 
 
The Commission on Devolution in Wales (the Silk Commission) was the corresponding 
report to the Calman Commission in Scotland. It reported in two stages; its first report 
focused on fiscal devolution
44
 and its second report made recommendations regarding 
constitutional matters.
45
 
 
The Wales Act 2014 was passed in December 2014 and reflects the first report published by 
the Silk Commission. It devolves partial income tax powers to the National Assembly by 
allowing it to set a Welsh Rate of Income Tax.
46
 It also devolves other forms of taxes for land 
transactions and allows the Welsh Ministers powers to borrow money.
47
 This is in line with 
the UK Government’s objective of increasing the accountability of devolved administration 
for the revenue they spend.
48
 Regarding the National Assembly itself, it changes the term of 
an Assembly to five years, allows candidates to stand in a constituency and in a region at the 
same election, and removes the ability to sit in the Assembly and the House of Commons at 
the same time.
49
  
 
The Scottish independence referendum was the catalyst to start implementation of some of 
the Silk Commission’s constitutional recommendations from their second report.50 The UK 
Government paper Powers for a Purpose promised Wales a ‘clear, robust and lasting 
devolution settlement.’51 A draft Wales Bill was published in October 2015 to bring these 
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constitutional proposals into effect. It proposed a reserved powers model for Wales, similar to 
the settlement in Scotland.
52
 It would also have declared the permanence of the National 
Assembly and Welsh Government, and statutorily confirmed the Sewel convention for Wales 
as done for Scotland. Other proposals were to transfer powers over the Assembly’s own 
affairs and elections. It would also devolve further powers to the National Assembly and 
Welsh Ministers over transport regulations, local government, energy and the environment.
53
 
 
At first sight it seems that there are clear parallels with the Scottish settlement which closes 
the asymmetrical divide. However, the draft Bill was heavily criticised as not being based on 
rational principles and not meeting the aims set by the Government of a ‘stronger, clearer and 
fairer devolution settlement.’54 Criticisms were mainly seen in three areas; the design of the 
reservation model, the division of executive powers between the UK and the Welsh 
governments, and the reservation of criminal and private law.
55
 
 
Changing from a conferred to a reserved powers model has been a particular challenge. Even 
though the Silk Commission recommended a reserved powers model it also highlighted some 
of the virtues of the conferred powers model.
56
 Following a Supreme Court case challenging 
the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill it was held that the National Assembly has powers which 
extended beyond those expressly conferred if those provisions fairly and realistically relate to 
a matter which is devolved.
57
 This allowed the National Assembly some competence outside 
those subjects expressed in the 2006 Act which meant that its competence was broader than 
expected. However, the proposals in the draft Bill attempted to reduce the National 
Assembly’s current powers by reserving significant amount of matters, around 220, without 
clear justification.
58
  
 
Executive powers in Wales are not aligned with legislative powers of the National 
Assembly.
59
 Therefore, some executive powers over devolved areas may still lie with the UK 
Minister who needs to consent to any changes made in Wales. The draft Bill required further 
consent from UK Ministers if Welsh laws affected the functions of public authorities. In this 
regard, it was argued that this extended the powers of UK Ministers and reduced the 
legislative competence of the National Assembly.
60
 The National Assembly was concerned 
that it could lead to the UK executive over-ruling the legislature in Wales, which was, 
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according to the constitutional and legislative affairs committee, ‘constitutionally 
unacceptable’.61 It therefore risked creating a more complex system where the National 
Assembly had fewer powers.
62
  
 
Lastly, the draft Bill attempted to reserve private law, criminal law and civil penalties. 
Reserving these legal matters was an attempt to protect the single legal jurisdiction of 
England and Wales. In effect, this meant that the National Assembly could not legislate to 
change the law on these matters unless it was ‘necessary’ to do so. This was seen as a very 
high test for National Assembly legislation to reach and was, according to the Welsh Affairs 
Committee at Westminster, not the correct test to use.
63
 The difficulties of retaining a single 
jurisdiction while transferring legislative powers brings into question the sustainability of a 
single England and Wales jurisdiction which can accommodate two legislatures. Recently, 
the Welsh Government has strengthened its support for a distinct jurisdiction to recognise the 
laws of Wales.
64
 However, the UK Government have so far rejected such calls. This will be a 
fundamental issue to resolve to ensure a long-term devolution settlement in Wales.    
 
Wales is still a distance from achieving a clear and long-term constitutional settlement. With 
the impetus from Scotland for further devolution it has been suggested that the process in 
Wales has been rushed.
65
 With that in mind, the Secretary of State for Wales has paused the 
progress of the Bill and made commitments to make substantial changes to the three areas 
highlighted in this section.
66
 The next version of the Bill is expected in the summer of 2016. 
The devolution settlement in Wales has always been behind Scotland, and Northern Ireland, 
and that asymmetry is set to continue with Wales still hanging on to the hem of the kilt.  
 
England 
 
On the morning following the Scottish referendum David Cameron had a specific message 
for England. He said; ‘I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national 
discussion is England…and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard.’67 The 
House of Commons also noted that the referendum and the promise of further powers to the 
devolved nations of the UK had ‘generated the political momentum towards further 
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devolution in England.’68 The Government established a Cabinet Committee to set out the 
devolution options for England to run alongside the Smith Commission. Their report, The 
Implications of Devolution for England, was published in December 2014 but it highlighted 
differences between both sides of the coalition government at the time regarding the future 
governance of England.
69
 
 
Professor Robert Hazell has highlighted the breadth and dynamics of the ‘English 
Question’.70 It is possible to consider it from two perspectives. On the one hand, there is the 
consideration of England’s place in the Union on similar terms to other nations of the UK. On 
the other hand, there is the perspective of regionalism and devolution of powers within 
England.
71
 The UK Government have initiated reforms to tackle both issues, initially from a 
regionalism perspective and more recently from a national perspective. 
 
Regionalism and Localism in England 
 
Devolution in England has received greater publicity since the Scottish referendum but an 
array of initiatives had already been undertaken by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government since 2011.
72
 Their intention was to remove the ‘top-down 
bureaucracy’ in the regional structure and adopt a subsidiarity approach to decentralise power 
to ‘the lowest appropriate level’.73 This was in line with their localism agenda which 
promised ‘radical devolution of power and greater financial autonomy to local government 
and community groups.’74  
 
The coalition government started their work on the localism agenda by abolishing the 
regional structures created in England by the last administration a decade before. Regional 
Spatial Strategies were revoked and Regional Development Agencies were abolished.
75
 As 
well as removing the Labour government initiatives the coalition government went further by 
abolishing the Government Offices of the Regions which was a form of administrative 
decentralisation.
76
 The government were of the opinion that those administrative regions were 
significantly complex and did not reflect ‘real functional economic areas.’77 Its change of 
approach invited local authorities to come together to form local enterprise partnerships. This 
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would give powers to local authorities and local businesses to promote their own local 
development.
78
  
 
Co-operation between local authorities was further enabled with the ability to create 
combined authorities through the Local Democracy, Economic Development and 
Construction Act 2009. Under the procedure in the Act the Secretary of State could agree to 
create an Order establishing specific combined authorities. Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority became the first such organisation in 2011. Under the 2009 Act, combined 
authorities could take responsibilities over economic development, regeneration, transport, or 
functions which the local authorities wanted to transfer to it.
79
 
 
At a lower level the government also initiated legislative reform to devolve powers to 
neighbourhoods and local communities through the Localism Act 2011. The Act allowed 
local authorities more freedom and flexibility from central government. The 2011 Act gave 
local authorities a ‘general power of competence’ and it allowed Ministers to transfer 
functions from central government or government agencies to local authorities and combined 
authorities. This would potentially give cities, in particular, more control over housing, 
planning, and economic development.
80
 Following from the 2011 Act there are now several 
initiatives where local authorities can receive enhanced powers.  
 
In line with the focus of economic regeneration of cities the government announced a 
programme of ‘City Deals’ and ‘Growth Deals’.81 These agreements allow cities greater 
freedom and flexibility for developing growth and infrastructure with the transfer of more 
finance from the Treasury but in return must have stronger accountability.
82
  
 
The Conservative Party were keen to continue with this model of localism and 
decentralisation.
83
  As a result, the combined authority approach was significantly expanded 
by the Conservative government following the 2015 general election and complimented its 
ambition for a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ to regenerate the North of England.84 This saw the 
introduction of ‘Devolution Deals’ under the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 
2016. These go beyond City Deals by allowing combined authorities, and other local 
authority bodies, to take responsibility for more functions than the 2009 Act. This has 
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allowed authorities to negotiate a significant range of powers. For example, the Greater 
Manchester Devolution Deal will transfer responsibility to the Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority for a wide range of projects such as, inter alia, education and skills, transport, 
employment support, land and housing, and public services such integrating health and social 
care, the fire service and responsibilities of the police and crime commissioner.
85
 Currently, 
there are 12 devolution deals agreed each with their own level of powers.
86
 Therefore, 
devolution within England is just as much an asymmetrical process as is devolution on the 
national level in the UK.
87
 
 
It is significant that the government have insisted on using ‘devolution’ rather than 
‘decentralisation’ to describe its reforms in England. A cabinet paper for the coalition 
government noted that devolution to the nations of the UK is ‘different to localism and 
decentralisation within a country.’88 There are clear differences in their design compared to 
national devolution as they are created through secondary legislation and central government 
still retain substantial control.
89
 However, that does not necessarily make ‘devolution deals’ 
less significant as they may confer further and wider powers in future. As Dr Andrew Blick 
notes, consideration of devolution in the future will require the consideration of local 
government and the appreciation that both the local and national level of governance are 
‘distinct but associated.’90  
 
The National Level 
 
As the McKay Commission noted, ‘strengthening local government in England does not 
tackle the governance of England.’91 On the national level, there have been attempts to tackle 
the English Question and to recognise England as a distinct part of the UK. The McKay 
Commission was established by the coalition government in 2012 to consider how the House 
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of Commons could deal with ‘legislation which affects only part of the United Kingdom’.92 
Since devolution of primary law-making powers the UK Parliament is increasingly 
legislating for England only. The McKay Commission found that ‘governing arrangements 
for England in the post-devolution era are emerging more or less by default.’93 However, 
Parliament had not adapted to recognise its new role as the Parliament of England as well as 
of the UK.
94
 The question can be further framed as the ‘West Lothian Question’; that 
Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh Members of Parliament can vote on legislation which only 
affects England, while English MPs cannot vote on the same matters in the devolved parts of 
the UK.  
 
The McKay Commission set the principle that decisions which have a distinct or separate 
effect on England should only be taken with the consent of a majority of MPs from 
England.
95
 This is a similar principle to that of the Sewel Convention in Scotland.
96
 
Consequently, the House of Commons procedures would need to be amended to allow 
English-only legislation to be identified and for the voice of English MPs to be heard.
97
 
 
The Government did not respond immediately to the McKay Commission.
98
 However, in 
light of the Scottish referendum, tackling the West Lothian Question became a necessity.
99
 
The Conservative Party were in favour of an 'English Votes for English Laws' (EVEL) model 
which was underpinned by the principle in the McKay Commission.
100
 They proceeded to 
promise a veto for English MPs in their 2015 General Election Manifesto and then moved to 
implement their EVEL proposals by proposing amendments to the Standing Orders of the 
House of Commons.
101
 After initial proposals were criticised
102
 the amended Standing Orders 
were approved by the House of Commons in October 2015.  
 
The new procedure requires the Speaker of the House of Commons to certify whether a bill 
should be subject to the new procedure when the Bill, or particular clauses, relates to England 
only, or England and Wales, matters and is within the legislative competence of the other 
relevant devolved legislatures.
103
 Once certification is granted the relevant Bill will proceed 
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in a similar way to other Bills but will go through a Committee stage which involves only 
members from England, or England and Wales as appropriate. Following that, it will go to 
the Report stage of the House as normal but then to a Legislative Grand Committee (LGC) of 
the relevant countries affected. Any member of the House can speak in the LGC but only 
members from the relevant countries can vote to give consent to the Bill. In effect, this is 
legislative consent motion for English MPs, along the lines of the Sewel convention for 
devolved legislatures. The Bill continues through the other procedures in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords as normal following those supplementary stages.   
 
The House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
(PACAC) have raised concerns regarding this new procedure.
104
 In particular, its 
sustainability and long-term use seem in doubt due to the complexity of the drafting and the 
fact that a future government could easily revoke them.
105
 As a result, the committee noted 
that ‘they cannot be considered to be part of a stable constitutional settlement that will 
endure.’106 PACAC also expressed concerns about the wider constitutional implications in 
terms of determining what ‘relates exclusively to England or to England and Wales’ as there 
may be cross-border implications.
107
 This places the Speaker in a very difficult position and 
PACAC suggested that the test is not as simple as it first appears.
108
 There is also a 
perception that it is creating two tiers of MPs.
109
 
 
Responding to the West Lothian question was an important concern for the Conservative 
government, especially following the devolution of further powers to Scotland. However, 
there is some scepticism regarding how sustainable the current procedure for EVEL will be 
and so it is unlikely that this has settled the governance of England on a national level for the 
long-term. 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
Devolution in Northern Ireland is again a unique process. The first devolved administration in 
the UK was established in Northern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 which 
created the partition of Ireland. It was in response to the calls for Home Rule for Ireland that 
it became necessary to create two separate administrations, one in the North for the six 
counties of Ulster and one in the South, which is now the Republic of Ireland.
110
 This was to 
appease the unionist community in Northern Ireland who wanted to continue with the union 
with Britain. The deep rooted history of conflict between the unionist and nationalist 
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communities in Northern Ireland was a factor in the origins of devolution in Northern Ireland 
and continues to be so today.
111
   
 
The 1920 Act established a Northern Ireland Parliament, government and a courts system.
112
 
However, due to the troubles and violence between both communities in Northern Ireland the 
Parliament had to be prorogued in 1972 and direct rule returned to Westminster.
113
 This 
continued to be the position until the Belfast Agreement was signed on Good Friday 1998.
114
  
 
The Good Friday Agreement set the foundations for establishing the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (NI Assembly) through the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The NI Assembly has 108 
members elected through the Single Transferrable Vote system. Northern Ireland has a 
reserved powers model but has two tiers of reserved powers. ‘Excepted matters’ are matters 
such as inter alia, the crown, defence and international relations which cannot be devolved.
115
 
On the other hand, ‘reserved matters’ are matters which may be devolved in future or which 
the NI Assembly may legislate on with the UK Minister’s consent.116 A unique element of the 
Northern Ireland settlement is the requirement of a power-sharing executive. So far, this has 
required unionist and nationalist parties to form a coalition government together.
117
 However, 
this has been particularly difficult due to the history of both sides and as a result the NI 
Assembly was suspended between 2002 and 2006.  
 
The St Andrews Agreement 2006 saw the NI Assembly re-established in 2007.
118
 This 
Agreement ensured support for policing and the rule of law across the community so that 
policing and justice could be devolved, and reformed the power-sharing arrangements of the 
executive so that they are not so strict.
119
 However, even the new power-sharing arrangement 
has been difficult to implement and has, according to Dickson, caused ‘paralysis.’120 As a 
result, much of the recent tensions and talks have been regarding the continuing peace 
process and dealing with the legacy of the troubles.
121
 
 
The difficult political and community context of Northern Ireland meant that the Scottish 
referendum had a different impact and reaction in Northern Ireland compared to other parts of 
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the UK.
122
 It was a matter of trying to resolve issues of the past and on-going issues regarding 
devolution in Northern Ireland rather than introducing further powers. There had also been 
issues regarding financing devolution which required resolution. The Stormont House 
Agreement was signed in December 2014 and aims to deal with those issues.
123
 
 
To do so, the agreement establishes several options to tackle the historical issues in Northern 
Ireland such as establishing a Historical Investigations Unit. In terms of finance, corporation 
tax would be devolved and a financial support package of £2 billion was agreed.
124
 In return 
the Northern Ireland executive will have to reform and reduce the size of public services and 
welfare. Lastly, institutional reform to the NI Assembly and executive were agreed which 
will reduce the NI Assembly to 90 members and government departments to 9.
125
 There are 
also provisions for putting in place an ‘official opposition’ if parties did not want to take their 
place in the power-sharing executive.
126
  
 
Like other nations in the UK, devolution in Northern Ireland has its own dynamic and context 
and the historical troubles and the strict institutional design make devolution difficult to 
implement. Changes through the Stormont Agreement will ease some pressures but will 
likely require further agreements and reform in the future. 
 
Implications for the UK Constitution 
 
Before concluding, it is worth considering the possible implications of the several devolution 
processes on the UK constitution.
127
 The House of Lord Committee on the Constitution have 
expressed concern that the Union, as a whole, is not being taken into account and that things 
are being done in an ad-hoc way.
128
  
 
One reason for this may be that the ‘Scottish Vow’ meant that political leaders were already 
committed to the Smith Commission and this, according to the Lords Committee, did not give 
Parliament a place for consultation and discussion.
129
 Consequently, it has been argued that 
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where constitutional reform usually takes years to occur the current tranche of reforms have 
been rushed.
130
 This has also meant that reforms have developed separately in each part of the 
UK without a ‘coherent process for planning the future of a devolved Union.’131 As a result, 
there have been concerns that some fundamental constitutional matters were being devolved 
without discussion as to whether they ‘are better dealt with in a consistent manner across the 
UK.’132   
 
The provisions which have the most direct implications for the UK constitution are sections 1 
and 2 of the Scotland Act 2016. The House of Lords Constitution Committee argued that it 
could be interpreted that Parliament is limiting its powers in a procedural way and there is a 
possibility that judges may uphold that limitation on Parliament.
133
 As a result, the committee 
argued that these provisions ‘risk introducing uncertainty concerning the absolute nature of 
parliamentary sovereignty where there should be none.’134 
 
In turn, there is a perception that the UK is moving towards federalism: 
 
Nonetheless, we note that both these draft clauses appear to be moving the United 
Kingdom in a federal direction, attempting to crystallise by way of statute, if not a 
written constitution, the status and powers of the devolved institutions in a way that 
has hitherto not been the case.
135
 
 
Moving towards a more federal and codified constitution is advocated by some groups so that 
there are clearer principles and rules uniting the Union.
136
 However, although there are 
federal characteristics in the current reforms to devolution, moving towards a formal federal 
constitution seems to be unlikely due to the lack of a written constitution,
137
 parliamentary 
sovereignty, and the overpowering size of England if it was not separated into regions.
138
 It 
seems, therefore, that asymmetrical devolution is here to stay for now.
139
 
 
To ensure that the new devolution reforms are effective particular attention will need to be 
given to intergovernmental relations in the UK.
140
 The intergovernmental relationship is 
currently regulated through a Memorandum of Understanding between the administrations of 
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the UK but has often been seen as weak.
141
 The Smith Commission called for a more 
‘productive, robust, visible and transparent relationship’ so that the inter-governmental 
system is fixed to deal with more complex devolution.
142
 The House of Lords Committee on 
the Constitution has suggested ways forward to enhance the current arrangements with more 
formal bilateral arrangements in new complex areas such as welfare and taxation, more space 
for joint policy making, more sub-committees to involve all administrations, and that the 
government should consider placing the framework for such relations on statutory footing.
143
 
Given the growing complexity and shared powers between the UK and devolved 
administrations managing an effective intergovernmental process will be an important part of 
ensuring that the new devolution settlements are successful. 
 
Two further factors which may influence the relationship between the UK government and 
the devolved administrations soon will be the UK referendum on the European Union and the 
proposals for a UK Bill of Rights to replace the current Human Rights Act 1998.  
 
So far, as foreign policy is a reserved matter, there has been a lack of discussion with 
devolved legislatures and administrations on the UK’s place in the EU and the upcoming 
referendum.
144
 However, the Scottish First Minister has already indicated the possibility of a 
second independence referendum if Scotland votes to remain while the rest of the UK voted 
to leave the EU.
145
 There are also suggestions that a legislative consent motion may be 
required by devolved legislatures if their relationship with EU law under the devolution Acts 
is changed following the referendum.
146
 Whatever the result of the referendum, it is likely to 
have particular effects on the devolved administrations, as well as the whole of the UK, and 
will be an interesting context to how the domestic constitutional settlements develop. 
 
Secondly, the devolved administrations may pose an obstacle to enacting a UK Bill of 
Rights.
147
 Firstly, devolved legislatures have a direct relationship with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as their laws must come within convention rights or 
risk being quashed.
148
 Therefore, if the UK government attempts to pass legislation to repeal 
the Human Rights Act and impose a UK Bill of Rights it has been suggested that the 
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devolved legislatures could refuse to give legislative consent which would be ‘unchartered 
constitutional territory’.149 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the Scottish independence referendum re-enlightened the debate regarding 
devolution throughout the UK. In his speech in September 2014 the Prime Minister implied 
‘a new and fair settlement that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom’. However, what 
has emerged is a series of individual and separate processes which reform the constitution in 
each part of the UK. This is unsurprising to an extent due to the different unions which 
comprise the UK and that development in the UK ‘has never been uniform.’150 It may be true 
that the new reforms show that the UK is further living up to its name as a ‘state of 
unions’.151 
 
As expected, Scotland has seen a further extension of their legislative and, more prominently, 
fiscal powers which now makes the Scottish Parliament a very powerful institution. Wales 
has seen proposals for a more stable settlement but this has not been translated into a concrete 
legislative settlement as yet. The UK response to the Scottish referendum allowed England to 
develop structures and procedures to give it a distinct voice at regional and national level. 
The Stormont Agreement in Northern Ireland will aim to deal further with the historical 
divisions as well attempting to progress devolution through reforming the structure of the NI 
Assembly and devolving more financial powers.  
 
Given the fact that each devolution process is individualised and particular to each nation 
there has been concerns that this has overlooked the UK as a Union. As a result, the UK 
constitution, and the place of the devolved nations within it, will face further challenges in 
future which must be carefully monitored to ensure that there is a ‘fair settlement’ for the 
whole of the UK. 
 
 
                                                     
149
 ibid para 182. 
150
 Mitchell (n 3) 14. 
151
 Ibid 6. 
